Office of Chief Counsel Internal Revenue Service

memorandum

CC:WR:SCA:LN:TL-N-1471-00

JMMarr

date: JUN 12 2000

to: Chief, Appeals Division, Southern California District

Attn: Jeffrey M. Galante, Associate Chief

Attn: Jon B. Hales, Appeals Officer

from: Joyce M. Marr, Attorney

June Y. Bass, Assistant District Counsel

District Counsel, Southern California District, Laguna Niguel

subject:

Advisory Opinion Concerning Forms 872

EIN:

Income Tax Years: ____, ___ and ____

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

This advice constitutes return information subject to I.R.C. \$ 6103. This advice contains confidential information subject to attorney-client and deliberative process privileges and if prepared in contemplation of litigation, subject to the attorney work product privilege. Accordingly, the Examination or Appeals recipient of this document may provide it only to those persons whose official tax administration duties with respect to this case require such disclosure. In no event may this document be provided to Examination, Appeals, or other persons beyond those specifically indicated in this statement. This advice may not be disclosed to taxpayers or their representatives.

This advice is not binding on Examination or Appeals and is not a final case determination. Such advice is advisory and does not resolve Service position on an issue or provide the basis for closing a case. The determination of the Service in the case is to be made through the exercise of the independent judgment of the office with jurisdiction over the case.

This is in reply to your request dated March 8, 2000, for advice on: (1) the validity of Consents to Extend the Time to Assess Tax (Forms 872) previously secured by Exam; and (2) the proper way to caption Forms 872 to be secured to extend the time to assess beyond. As discussed below, subsequent to forwarding to us your request for advice, you obtained a Form 872 to extend the assessment period to

ISSUE

Whether	Forms 8	72 s	e <u>cured</u>	to	extend	_the	time	to	assess	
<u>income tax</u> es	against	the				cor	nsolic	date	ed group	for
, , , , , , , , ,	and	are	valid	?					-	


CONCLUSION

Yes, the Forms 872 can be defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the period of limitations through consolidated group for the defended as valid waivers of the defende

The revenue agent assigned to this matter has recently informed you that alleges that the proper party to execute the Forms 872 is . There may be facts which the Service is unaware of that support this conclusion. Accordingly, in an abundance of caution, we recommend that you obtain a consent to extend the time to assess beyond for the spear captioned spear captioned spear of the spear captioned spear and at the bottom of the first page of the Form 872, place another asterisk and right after it type:


With respect to the consolidated tax liability of the formerly known as (EIN:) and Subsidiaries consolidated group for the taxable year ...

FACTS²



²Our understanding of the facts of this case is limited to the facts set forth in the Appeals Division's request for our advice, additional information that the Appeals Division and the Examination Division have provided to us, and information we have located on LEXIS. If you learn that any of the facts known to us are incorrect or incomplete in any material respect, you should contact our office immediately.

According to information obtained from the LEXIS COMPANY file, at the time in question, was a wholly owned subsidiary of the company in Germany.




return it filed for the short period ended December 31, (EIN EIN
(EIN and also included the
aforesaid three corporations on the Affiliations Schedule for a
short-period return filed by it for the tax year beginning, and ending .
was an indirect subsidiary of
, a German corporation which is the ultimate parent of
of an internal reorganization of the group corporate
structure, all of the shares of transferred to the shares of the property of the share corporation.
On the Affiliations Schedule for
consolidated income tax return, included the following corporations: (EIN
(EIN),
(EIN), and (EIN).
is still in existence.
is its immediate parent.
By a "Unanimous Written Consent," the Board of Directors of adopted the following resolution effective
adopted the forfowing resolution effective
With respect to the consolidated income tax returns filed by
for the years through inclusive, the
following Consents to Extend the Time to Assess Tax (Forms 872) have been executed:
Name of Taxpayer as Date Executed For Date to Which
Year Shown on Form 872 Taxpayer The Service Statute Extended
known as
Successor in Interest
to formerly known as
formerly
known as

	Name of Taxpayer as	Date Ex	ecuted For	Date to Which
<u>Year</u>	Shown on Form 872	<u>Taxpayer</u>	The Service	Statute Extended
	, formerly known as			
	to formerly known as	y		
	known as			
	to formerly	7		
	known as formerly	&		
	, formerly known as			
	, Successor in Interest to formerly known as	7		
	, Successor in Interest to formerly known as	,		
	known as			

Immediately after the caption on this Form 872, an asterisk has been inserted and the following statement has been typed at the bottom of the form, "*With respect to the consolidated tax liability of the the consolidated group for taxable years and and and "

⁵ <u>See infra</u> footnote 4.



⁶ <u>See infra</u> footnote 4.

The Form 872 executed on was prepared by the Service and mailed by Appeals Officer Jon Hales (Mr. Hales) to " (fka ")" by a letter dated that it was for the tax periods ended and the upper-right hand corner that it was for the tax periods ended and the letter stated, "[t]he time limitation for assessing tax will expire before Appeals can complete consideration of this case." Mr. Hales had previously contacted representative to offer him a conference with Appeals for tax years and ...

DISCUSSION

I.R.C. § 1501 grants affiliated groups of corporations the privilege of filing returns on a consolidated basis. If consolidated returns are filed, the members of the group consent to be bound by the legislative regulations promulgated under the authority of I.R.C. § 1502; I.R.C. § 1501.

Where the common parent remains in existence, even if it no longer is the common parent, it remains the agent for the group with regard to years in which it was the common parent of the group. Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77(a); Southern Pacific Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 395, 401 (1985).

Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-77T, which was promulgated in 1988 by the Service to supplement Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77, modifies the "exclusive agent" rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77(a). common parent corporation ceases to be the common parent of a group, whether or not the group remains in existence, Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-77T(a)(4) provides "alternative agents" for the affiliated group, but only for purposes of mailing notices of deficiency and for executing waivers of the statute of limitations. Any one or more of the following corporations may act as "alternative agents" for the group: (i) the common parent of the group for all or any part of the year to which the notice or waiver applies; (ii) a successor to the former common parent in a transaction to which I.R.C. § 381(a) applies; (iii) the agent designated by the group under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77(d); or (iv) if the group remains in existence under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-75(d)(2) or (3), the common parent of the group at the time the waiver is given.

Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-77T is effective for taxable years for which the due date (without extensions) for filing the consolidated return is after September 7, 1988. Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-77T(b). Simultaneous with the promulgation of the temporary regulation, the Service amended Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77

by adding paragraph (e), cross referencing to Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-77T.

The crucial issue in the present case is whether or is the proper party to extend the statute of limitations with respect to the consolidated group for the years preceding the merger of with with consolidated.

Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-77T governs here. It applies to this case because: (a) which was the common parent corporation of the common parent; and (2) the statutes of limitations that Appeals seeks to extend are for taxable years for which the due date (without extensions) for filing of the consolidated returns is after September 7, 1988.

Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-77T(a)(4)(i) provides as an "alternative agent" the common parent of the group for all or any part of the year to which the waiver applies. was the common parent of the consolidated group for the years to which the waivers apply. It is still in existence. Therefore, with respect to consolidated group's with respect to cons

The other subparagraphs of Temp. Reg. § 1.1502-77T(a)(4) are inapplicable. Subparagraph (a)(4)(ii), which provides as an alternative agent a successor to the former common parent in a transaction in which I.R.C. § 381(a) applies, is inapplicable because survived the merger and has no successor. Subparagraph (a)(4)(iii), which provides as an alternative agent the agent designated by the group under Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77(d), is inapplicable because has not dissolved nor does it appear that it contemplates dissolution, contrary to the requirement of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-77(d).

Nor do we believe that subparagraph (a)(4)(iv), which provides as an alternative agent the common parent of the group at the time the waiver is given where the group remains in existence following a reverse acquisition or downstream transfer, is applicable to the facts of this case. The facts do not show that a downstream transfer occurred. In addition, the merger of with did not constitute a reverse acquisition. First, the shareholders of did not receive any stock of in exchange for their shares of they received cash in exchange for their shares of

outstanding common stock. Second, the consolidated group filed a short year tax return for the year ended thus thus indicating that the group ceased to exist. In a reverse acquisition, the acquired consolidated group continues in existence. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-75(d)(3). Therefore, we are of the opinion that the merger did not constitute a reverse acquisition.

Thus, is the proper party to execute the Forms 872 with respect to the consolidated group's taxable years and and as a sis indicated in the preceding summary of FACTS, all of the Forms 872 secured by the Service for the aforesaid tax years have been executed by officers of duly authorized to execute the Forms 872 on its behalf. See Rev. Rul. 83-41, 1983-1 C.B. 399, clarified and amplified, Rev. Rul. 84-165, 1984-2 C.B. 305.

The Forms 872 executed on behalf of the taxpayer on and and are erroneously show the name of the taxpayer as " , Successor in Interest to ", formerly known as "." There were no other Forms 872 executed to hold the statutes of limitations open beyond until the Form 872 was secured in correctly reflecting the taxpayer's name as " , formerly known as "." Therefore, we must consider whether the Forms 872 which were executed on , and are valid.

A consent to extend the period of limitations is essentially a unilateral waiver of a defense by the taxpayer and is not a contract. Strange v. United States, 282 U.S. 270 (1931); Kelley v. Commissioner, 45 F.3d 348, 350 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995); Piarulle V. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1035, 1042 (1983). Contract principles are significant, however, because I.R.C. § 6501(c)(4) requires that the parties reach a written agreement as to the extension. Piarulle, 80 T.C. at 1042. The term "agreement" means a manifestation of mutual assent. Id. It is the objective manifestation of mutual assent as evidenced by the parties' overt acts that determines whether the parties have made an agreement. Kronish v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 684, 693 (1988).

When a written agreement to extend the period for making assessments is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the ambiguity and to determine the parties' intent. The extension will then be interpreted in accordance with the parties' intent. Constitution Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 426 (1931). A written instrument is ambiguous when it can reasonably be interpreted to have more than one meaning. Sawyer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-12.

Generally, a consent that is clear on its face and that contains no ambiguous language <u>is</u> the objective manifestation of mutual assent and will stand by itself. That is, the Court will not consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent when interpreting the agreement reached by the parties.

This general rule, however, does not apply where the parties have made a "mutual mistake" in the drafting of the consent (also referred to as a "scrivener's mistake"). See Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 782-784 (1989); see also San Francisco Wesco Polymers v. Commissioner, and T.C. Memo. 1999-146; Kelley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1990-158, aff'd, 45 F.3d 348 (9th Cir. 1995). "A mutual mistake exists 'where there has been a meeting of the minds of the parties and an agreement actually entered into but the agreement in its written form does not express what was really intended by the parties.'" Woods, 92 T.C. at 782 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 920 (5th Ed. 1979)). Under such circumstances, the Court will reform the consent so that it conforms to the agreement of the parties. Woods, 92 T.C. at 782-783; San Francisco Wesco Polymers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-146; Kelley, T.C. Memo 1990-158.

In this case, if the Forms 872 executed by in and and mistakenly fail to express the mutual intent of the parties, the Forms 872 properly may be reformed to conform to the parties' intentions, if there is extrinsic evidence to support such action.

We think that there is sufficient extrinsic evidence showing that the taxpayer and the Service intended to extend the period of limitation for rather than

First, although the Forms 872 executed on behalf of the , listed and taxpayer on as successor to they listed the taxable years ended December 31, December 31, , and December 31, as the periods to be extended. first filed return was for the period ended December 31, ______. Thus, the Forms 872's references to the years ended December 31, December 31, and December 31, must have referred to not was not in existence Since , it was not required to file returns and did until not have any tax liabilities for the years

Second, the Forms 872 refer to ______ as "successor" to ______. However, is not a successor to ______. which still exists. Rather, ______ is _____ is _____ immediate parent.

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taxpayer.

Third, the transmittal letter which forwarded to the taxpayer Form 872 for and that was executed on was addressed to " [In addition, the letter was from Mr. Hales who was actively considering case and had been in contact its representative. Fourth, the fact that subsequently, on ex<u>ecuted a Fo</u>rm 872 on behalf of the tax years and supports the position that he knew and understood that the Forms 872 he had signed in were meant to extend the statute of limitations for Wyle Electronics, not Fifth, although had no authority to behalf, the actual signatory, has such authority. The taxpayer should be informed here that we are relying on the equitable remedy of reformation of the Forms 872, based on mutual mistake in the drafting of the Forms 872. Thus, it is understood that **both parties** intended that execute these documents in his role as an officer of . It seems incoherent to take a position where we assert that it was the taxpayer's () intent to

The defense that the period of limitations has expired is an affirmative defense that the taxpayer would have to raise. Should or its subsidiaries challenge the validity of such consents, we will defend their validity on the basis of the analysis described above. As you know, however, there are hazards inherent in litigating any issue and we cannot guarantee any result.

execute the forms, but at the same time fear alerting the taxpayer in case it may claim that it did not have such an intent. The intent of the taxpayer is a matter solely in the "mind" of the

Please contact the undersigned at telephone number (949) 360-2688 if you have any questions or comments concerning the foregoing or would like assistance in drafting a letter to explaining the potential problems with the consents which have been secured and that the Service is relying on the equitable remedy of reformation of the Forms 872.

Attorney